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Visualizing the influence of geography, oil and geopolitics on civil 
wars in the Arab world:  A novel application of self-organizing maps 
and duration models 
Mohamed Mustafa and Mohaned T. Al-Hamdi 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate why some internal conflicts are terminated quickly while 
others linger for several decades without a looming resolution in the horizon. In an attempt to 
achieve this objective the role played by geopolitical factors in the Arab world’s internal 
conflicts was investigated. More specifically, we used Kohonen self-organizing maps, an 
artificial intelligence- based neural network technique, along with event duration models to 
investigate the role played by distance from the capital, access to international borders, terrain, 
valuable natural resources such as oil, and rebels fighting capability in civil wars in the Arab 
world. Using recently validated data spanning more than 50 years of Arab civil wars (1948-
2003), our findings indicate that previously ignored geopolitical factors seem to play an 
important role in the duration of internal conflicts in the Arab World. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Civil wars generally encompass three major parties: the existing government, at least one group 
of internal insurgents and possibly external actors who might intervene at a specific point in time 
in the internal conflict going on between the first two parties. In a study spanning around 70 
years, it has been found that while a quarter of internal conflicts end in less than eight months, 
another quarter lasts more than five years and some civil wars linger for decades (Cunningham, 
2006 
1
). In the Arab world context the southern secessionist movement in Yemen was crushed in 
less than three months in 1994, while the Israel-Palestine conflict lasted 20,088 days at the end of 
2003 (Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009 
2
). In order to investigate why some internal conflicts are 
terminated quickly while others linger for several decades without a looming resolution we use 
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SOM and duration models to understand the reason behind this wide variation in the duration of 
internal conflicts in the Arab world. 
 
Lacina and Gleditsch’s (2005) 3 data on battle deaths during internal conflicts reveal that an 
internal conflict that lasts for up to two years yields on average around 3,000 deaths, while a 
conflict that lasts longer than two years generates on average around 44,000 deaths. In fact the 
international community has recently been directly or indirectly involved in several Arab civil 
wars, including Libya and the Sudan. Such interventions carry a significant cost both in terms of 
the loss of life and the monetary cost resulting from peacekeeping operations. Thus, 
understanding why some Arab civil wars lasts significantly more than the others is an important 
topic both at the theoretical and practical levels. At the theoretical level, investigating why some 
internal conflicts are terminated quickly while others linger for several decades without a 
looming resolution in the horizon inherently involves deep understanding regarding the causes of 
fighting and the underlying reasons behind cooperation to end the civil conflict. At the practical 
level, finding an answer to this question might help policy-makers in designing more feasible 
responses to such conflicts. 
 
In this research we aim to contribute to the civil war duration literature by solely focusing on the 
geopolitical dynamics of internal conflicts in the Arab world. In fact several authors argued that 
there has been “a tendency to neglect the spatial context” in civil wars (Buhaug & Rod, 4). In a 
similar vein, Schutte and Weidmann (2011) 
5
 argued that the geographic aspect of civil wars has 
not been systematically examined because of the failure to understand how insurgent activities 
unfold in time-space domains. To remedy this void in the literature we focus on factors such as 
distance from the capital, terrain, natural resources and rebels fighting capabilities in an attempt 
to explain the duration of internal conflicts in the Arab world. Following Fearon’s (2004) 6 
seminal work on civil war duration, the Arab civil wars analyzed in this study satisfied the 
following criteria: (1) They involved fighting between a state/claimants to a state and a rebel 
group/non-state group who sought either to take power or to change state’s policies; (2) The 
conflict resulted in at least 1,000 people over its duration; and (3) The conflict resulted in killing 
at least 100 people on both sides, including civilians killed by fighting rebels. The last condition 
is aimed at ruling out possible massacres in the absence of organized opposition. This research is 
organized as follows. Next section presents the literature review and the study hypotheses. The 
research design and methodology aspects follow. The next section presents the results, while the 
final section discusses the research findings, implications and deals with avenues for future 
research. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
2.1 Distance from the capital 
 
Herbst (2000) 
7
 argues that distance plays a significant role in the geopolitics of internal civil 
conflicts since operating militarily over long distances puts the government troops in a clear 
disadvantage compared to the insurgents normally operating in remote areas. This problem might 
be exacerbated by logistical obstacles the government faces in internal conflicts involving 
distance areas. Other factors such as cost and lack of government support in remote areas 
controlled by insurgents might also explain the role of distance in civil wars duration (Buhaug, 
Gates and Lujala, 2009 
8
). 
 
Although there are few studies empirically investigating the role of distance in civil wars 
duration, these studies have generally found a positive relationship between distance and internal 
conflict duration. For example, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 
9
 found that separatist conflicts 
located in remote regions last longer. This finding has been corroborated by other studies, 
including Buhaug and Gates (2002) 
10
 and Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
11
. Buhaug and Rod (2006) 
12
 argue that the reason behind the positive relationship between distance and internal conflict 
duration might result from the government’s inability to control the hinterlands “because of the 
sheer distance from the center of state power.” (p. 318). This discussion suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: The further the conflict from the capital, the longer the duration of the civil war. 
 
2.2 Access to international border 
 
Rustad, Rod, Larsen and Gleditsch (2008) 
13
 found that access to an international border, which 
is located far from the political center is more likely to affect the internal conflict. Moreover, 
often rebels seek protection in a neighboring country making it almost impossible for the 
government’s troops to operate. This affects the government’s army efficiency and makes it 
harder to end the internal conflict quickly. In several recent Arab internal conflicts, the main 
rebel groups such as the Polisario in the case of Morocco operate from bases beyond the national 
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boundaries. This usually happens with the tacit support from the neigboring regime (Algeria). In 
fact several studies have found that the border length and interstate contiguity play an important 
role in internal conflicts’ duration (e.g. Murdoch and Sandler, 2002 14; Ward and Gleditsch, 2002 
15
; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009 
16
). This discussion suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: The nearer the conflict to an international border, the longer the duration of the civil war. 
 
2.3 Rough terrain 
 
The rough terrain hypothesis postulates that mountains, forests, jungles and swamps provide 
insurgents with shelter from the less mobile government forces and facilitates guerrilla war 
tactics, which increases the duration of internal civil conflicts. Several case studies, including 
Burma, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cambodia found a positive relationship between 
forest resources and duration of civil war (e.g. FAO, 
17
). However, Ross (2006) 
18
 noted that 
despite the importance of rough terrain in civil wars, this relationship has not been tested 
statistically. At the empirical level, Buhaug and Lujala (2005) 
19
 found the amount of 
mountainous terrain in the country relates positively to the duration of civil conflicts. However, 
the forest coverage in a country was found to be negatively related to the civil war duration. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
20
 merged both mountains and forests to represent rough terrain. 
Despite the fact that the authors found positive relationship between rough terrain and the 
duration of civil wars, this relationship did not reach statistical significance. Rustad, Rod, Larsen 
and Gleditsch (2008) 
21
 also found that conflict zones with large areas of forest have, on average, 
longer conflicts. This discussion suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The rough the terrain, the longer the duration of the civil war. 
 
2.4 Rebel capability 
 
Several studies have empirically tested the relationship between rebel capability and the duration 
of civil wars (e.g. Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009 
22
; Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009 
23
). Most of this empirical work has found that weak rebels increase the duration of internal 
conflict. The theoretical underpinnings of this preposition are based on several factors. First, 
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reaching a peaceful settlement between the government and rebels may be more costly compared 
to keeping the intensity of the conflict at an acceptable level for both parties (Walter, 2006 
24
). 
This is because crushing rebel groups that employ guerrilla tactics might be a considerable task 
that involves high military and economic cost. Because of fear of reprisals, rebels also might be 
reluctant to lay down arms even if they know that their objectives are unattainable. On the other 
hand, strong rebels may either defeat the government’s army or force the government to reach a 
peaceful settlement that quickly ends the conflict. This discussion suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: The weaker the rebels involved in the conflict, the longer the duration of the civil war. 
 
2.5 Oil and natural resources 
 
The relationship between natural resource dependence and civil war duration has been 
investigated extensively in the internal conflict literature. The direct link stream of literature 
argue that valuable natural resources such as oil and gas can easily be exploited by rebels in 
financing their arms purchase and their recruitment opportunities (e.g. Addison, Le Billon & 
Murshed, 2002 
25
; Auty, 2004 
26
; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004 
27
; Le Billon, 2001 
28
; Ross, 2006 
29
). 
This line of research argue that since natural resources might provide rebels engaged in civil 
wars economic opportunities not present during peace time, the insurgents might prefer 
continued fighting over peace, which leads to increase in the duration of civil wars involving 
valuable natural resources. Thus, according to this line of research, natural resources directly 
increase the likelihood of civil conflicts and decrease the likelihood of peaceful resolution to the 
conflict. On the other hand, the indirect link stream of literature argues that resources abundance 
might in fact have a negative impact on regime stability and economic growth, which suggests a 
more indirect path to internal conflict duration (e.g. Sachs & Warner, 
30
). This phenomenon is 
referred to in the literature as the oil curse (Ross, 2006 
31) or the “Dutch disease” argument 
which claims that oil-dependent nations are more prone to long civil wars compared to less 
mineral-affluent countries. 
 
These theoretical propositions have been confirmed empirically in several studies. For example 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
32
 found a nonlinear relationship between natural resources’ 
dependence and internal conflict duration in a study spanning 78 civil wars. Similar results were 
reported in Smillie (2002) 
33
 and Renner (2002) 
34
. Koos and Basedau (2013) 
35
 also found that 
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uranium operations are significantly linked to civil war duration when interacting with ethnic 
exclusion. Aydin and Regan (2011) 
36
 found countries with diamonds tend to have longer wars 
than others. This finding is supported in several Arab civil wars. For example, the existence of 
hydrocarbon reserves in southern Sudan conflict zone caused the civil war to last for quite a long 
time before the creation of the South Sudan republic. However, notable exceptions include 
studies by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) 
37
 and Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
38
. This discussion 
suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: The nearer the conflict to oil and valuable natural resources, the longer the duration of the 
civil war. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Data sources 
 
Data used in this study are taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset v. 3-2005. This 
dataset first appeared in Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand (2002) 
39
. It has 
subsequently been adapted for event history analysis by Gates and Strand (2004) 
40
 and used in 
several research papers, including Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) 
41
. To our knowledge, this is 
the first research to use the dataset to analyze the duration of civil war in the Arab world. In our 
research we use the duration of civil war in the Arab world between 1948 and 2003, measured in 
days, as our dependent variable. The average duration of internal conflicts in the Arab world was 
326 days and the most durable conflict is, not surprisingly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which 
exceeded 20,000 days by the end of 2003. Following Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) 
42
, coups 
d’etat conflicts were eliminated from the analysis since such conflicts are characterized by an 
armed conflict between two factions of government and have nothing to do with geopolitics.  
 
3.2 Measures 
 
Natural logarithm of the distance between the capital and the conflict zone was used as a 
measure of distance (Buhaug, Gates, & Lujala, (2009) 
43
). Following Buhaug and Gates (2009) 
44
, distances were estimated using a geodesic measure. Rugged terrain was measured by the 
percentage of mountains and forests in the conflict zone. A dummy variable was used to code 
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conflict zones near an international border. Because rebels operating far from the capital may not 
need to find a shelter in a neighboring country in order to avoid government forces, and since 
rebels with safe access to safe heavens nearby tend to be less dependent on bases in their home 
nation, we included an interaction term between distance and the existence of an international 
border. Rebels fighting capacity data were coded using Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan’s 
(2009) 
45
 classification which includes three categories (week, moderate, and strong). Following 
Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) 
46
, we operationalized this measure using a dichotomous 
variant since this was found to fit the data better. Finally, we code a dummy variable for the 
existence of oil in the conflict zone. This coding scheme is based on the work of Lujala, Rod and 
Thieme (2007) 
47
. 
 
 
3.3 Self-organizing maps 
 
 
The SOM or Kohonen maps are basically artificial neural networks (NN) techniques used to 
explore and visualize hidden patterns in highly complex and multidimensional data. This method 
was first introduced to the artificial NN literature by Kohonen (1982) 
48
. In fact SOM can be 
regarded as a clustering technique. Without resorting to the rigid assumptions of linearity or 
normality of traditional statistical techniques, these techniques aim at identifying different 
clusters in a large and complex data. Audrain-Pontevia (2006) 
49
 argues that SOM is similar to 
the k-means clustering method in that it clusters data “based on an unsupervised competitive 
algorithm where each cluster has a fixed coordinate in a topological map”. Thus an unsupervised 
training algorithm is used to train the SOM. In this training process no target output is provided 
and the network evolves until it convergence to a satisfactory solution. Lo & Bavarian (1993) 
50
 
has used the Gladyshev’s theorem to show that SOM models usually converge to an optimal 
solution.. 
 
 
The architecture of SOM is based on two layers, an input layer which classifies data based on 
their similarity, and an output layer responsible for self-organizing data in an ordered map where 
neurons with similar weights are organized together. The topology of the map is determined 
through the connections formed between adjacent neurons according to neighbourhood relations 
(Moreno et al. (2006) 
51
. In fact Silven et al. (2003) 
52
 argued that SOM can also be used for 
pattern classification since it merges information while preserving the most important 
topological and metrical relationships of the primary data elements on the display.  
 
                                               
SOM is characterized by unsupervised character of learning algorithm and excellent 
visualization ability. Thus these models have been used in several clustering and classification 
tasks, including vehicle routing (Ghaziri & Osman, 2006 
53
), network intrusion detection (Zhong 
et al. 2007 
54
), compounds pattern recognition (Yan, 2006 
55
), classifying cognitive performance 
in schizophrenic and healthy individuals (Silver & Shmoish, 2008 
56
), classifying magnetic 
resonance brain images (Chaplot et al. 2006 
57
), speech quality assessment (Mahdi, 2006 
58
), 
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mutual funds classification (Moreno et al. 2006 
59
), anomalous behavior in communication 
networks (Frota et al. 2007 
60
), and market segmentation (Kuo et al. 2002 
61
). 
 
3.4 Event history analysis 
 
As the name implies, event history or survival analysis looks at the time between events. This 
statistical technique was originally developed to study the time between medical intervention and 
death in order to demonstrate the usefulness of certain medical interventions (Drye, Wetherill & 
Pinnock, 2001 
62
). The standard event history analysis applied to study the duration of civil 
conflicts has traditionally been either the Weibull regression model or the Cox Proportional 
Hazard Model (e.g. Cunningham, 2006 
63
). Assuming some underlying “hazard function” that 
determines the baseline duration, event history models test the impact of a set of covariates on 
the duration of internal conflicts. In this study we employ the Weibull accelerated failure-time 
(AFT) regression model, though we additionally employ the Cox Proportional Hazard Model for 
robustness check. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Kohonen maps 
 
We use Kohonen SOM in order to explore the influence of geopolitical factors on the duration of 
civil wars in the Arab world. Among the several available software packages developed to 
analyze SOM models, we chose SOMine package version 5.0 (Viscovery software, 2008 
64
). 
This software automatically finds the efficient SOM clusters by applying advanced artificial 
intelligence techniques. In order to visualize the resulting SOM cluster structure, the unified 
distance matrix (U-matrix) has been used by some authors (e.g. Vijayakumar et al. 2007 
65
). 
However, since it has been argued that this method might not result in a map with crisp 
boundaries to the clusters (Worner & Gevrey, 2006 
66
), we use in this study a hierarchical cluster 
analysis with a Ward linkage method in order to clearly delineate the boundaries of each 
resulting cluster. Kohonen (2001) 
67
 has investigated two learning SOM algorithms. The first one 
is called the stochastic or sequential learning algorithm, while the second is known as the batch 
learning algorithm. Following Ding & Patra (2007) 
68
, we choose the sequential learning 
algorithm to train the SOM  since the sequential algorithm is stochastic in nature and is less 
likely trapped to a local minimum (reaching semi-optimal solution). 
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Figure 1 shows the SOM cluster results. In this two-dimensional hexagonal grid we clearly see 
the division of the input pattern into three clusters. However for purposes of comparison we 
present both the SOM-Ward and the unified distance matrix (U-matrix) results.  
 
                                                  [Please insert Figure 1] 
 
In this graph we can be read off patterns from the emerging landscape on the grid. For example, 
it can be seen that the green-colored cluster is the largest cluster with a frequency of 57.63%. 
This is the mid-range civil war duration cluster. Arab civil wars in this cluster are characterized 
by medium distance to capital (149 km), medium rebels’ fighting capability. Not surprisingly, 
this cluster is rich in oil and other valuable resources. The red-colored cluster represents the high 
duration civil war cluster. This cluster accounts for 28.39 per cent of internal conflicts in the 
Arab world. Civil wars in this cluster are characterized by easy access to an international border 
and high forest coverage. Table 1 summarizes the basic information in each cluster.  
 
                                                  [Please insert Table 1] 
 
Featuree or component maps can be constructed based on the SOM-Ward clusters (Vesanto, 
2000 
69
). In these maps known in the literature also as “temperature maps” (Churilov & Flitman, 
2006 
70
), nodes which share similar information are organized in close color proximity to each 
other. Feature maps show the distribution of values of the respective input component over the 
map. Resulting feature maps for every cluster and for all input attributes are shown in Figure 2.  
In this figure relationships between variables used in the study may be inspected by visually 
comparing the pattern of shaded pixels for each map. Thus, pattern similarity indicates strong 
relationships between the variables and vice-versa. In this figure the color scale at the bottom of 
shows that blue representsr low values, green represents mid-range values and red is used for 
high values. Finally, the name of input component used appears on top of each map. 
  
                                                  [Please insert Figure 2] 
 
From the feature maps we note, for example, that the extreme values represented in red in the 
Arab civil war feature map in the high duration cluster matches those extreme values found in 
the distance to capital and rich oil resources’ feature maps. Interestingly, the low duration cluster 
includes the lowest constellation of red pixels in the oil resources attribute. Through the use of 
colour, one can immediately see that the distance portion is significantly larger than the rest in 
the distance (dist) window for the high duration cluster -thus implying that distance to capital is 
positively related to civil war duration- a result that was previously confirmed by other 
researchers (e.g. Buhaug, Gates & Lujala, 2009 
71
). In essence, these SOM maps reveal the 
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existence of some theorized assumptions in the literature. It is also possible to find subgroups 
that do not follow the main theoretical assumptions in these maps. For example, a deviant 
subgroup might be detected when red dots are found in the middle of the green area. Similarly 
when two clearly separated areas are formed either by blue or red nodes, this might be 
considered as a sign of non-linear correlation (Thneberg & Hotulainen, 2006 
72
). 
 
4.2 Product-moment correlations 
 
Though it does not prove causation, correlation can serve as predictor of causation (Sekaran, 2000 
73
). The 
product moment correlations between the variables are shown in Table 2. This table was constructed to 
get a feel for the associations among the six constructs constituting the model. Most of the correlation 
coefficients were significant and had the expected sign. Thus the constructs, in general, are highly related. 
However this result should be interpreted with some caution due to the large sample size. 
 
[Please insert Table 2] 
 
4.3 Weibull and Cox proportional hazard regression models 
 
To formally test the research hypotheses, we conduct different specifications of the Weibull 
regression model. As a robustness check, we also employ the Cox proportional hazard regression 
model. However, since results obtained are virtually identical, we only report in Table 3 the 
Weibull AFT coefficients. These coefficients are fairly easy to interpret with positive values 
indicate longer civil war duration, and negative values imply shorter duration. Following 
Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) 
74
, robust Z and robust standard error statistics are estimated by 
clustering observations on Arab countries. Although previous hazard models had identified 
several plausible factors that might affect the duration of civil wars, we only controlled for the 
post-cold war era (civil wars that occurred after 1989). We did not control for other variables 
such as GDP or regime type since GDP data are only available from 1951, so controlling for this 
variable means that we lose three years of observations. On the other hand, the Polity index 
suffers from an inherent “endogeneity problem” (Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, 2009 75). Thus, 
because the end of Cold War also meant the end of several proxy wars in the Arab world, we 
control for post-cold war period in all models by using a dummy variable coded as 0 for the 
period before the end of Cold War (1989) and as 1 thereafter. It should be noted that we also did 
not control for ethnicity since the major divide between Sunni and Shia became evident only 
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after the end of the Iraq war. STATA version 11 statistical package was used to conduct the 
analysis (Codes are in the Appendix). 
 
From Table 3 we see that the four Weibull regression models confirm the hypothesized 
relationships related to civil war duration in the Arab world. For example, distance from the 
capital was found in all models to longer the duration of conflict, which confirms hypothesis 1. 
In model three, we see that access to international border increases the duration of civil conflict 
which supports hypothesis 2. Forest coverage, but not mountain coverage, was found to lengthen 
the duration of internal conflicts in the Arab world, which supports hypothesis 3. Strong rebels’ 
fighting capacity was found to shorten the duration of conflict, implying that weaker rebels make 
conflicts last longer, which supports hypothesis 4. Although oil resources was found to increase 
the duration of war as anticipated in hypothesis 5, this relationship did not reach statistical 
significance.  
                                                 [Please insert Table 3] 
 
Similar conclusions were reached using the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates shown in Figure 3. 
This figure visualizes the survival functions for access to border, rebels fighting capability, and 
access to oil resources in the conflict zone. From this graph is clear that access to border, weak 
rebels and access to valuable resources increases the duration of oil conflict in the Arab world. 
For example the effect of access to international border implies that after almost a year (365 
days), more than three-quarters of all civil conflicts in the Arab world are still active compared to 
around only one-quarter in case of no access to an international border. Similar conclusions 
might also be drawn regarding rebels fighting capacity and existence of oil. 
 
                                                 [Please insert Figure 3] 
 
5. Discussion, limitations and future research 
 
In this study we aimed to contribute to the civil war duration literature by solely focusing on the 
geopolitical dynamics of internal conflicts in the Arab world. Our findings indicate that 
previously ignored geopolitical factors seem to play an important role in the duration of internal 
conflicts. More specifically, we find that distance, access to international borders, terrain, and 
rebels fighting capability are positively related to civil war duration in the Arab world. Although 
12 
 
valuable natural resources such as oil was also found to be positively related to the duration of 
internal conflict, this variable did not reach statistical significance.  
 
The pattern of our findings is generally in line with studies investigating duration of civil 
conflicts in other parts of the world (e.g. Buhaug and Lujala,  
76
). The strong support for 
hypothesis 1 reflects inability of Arab governments to control peripheral regions remotely 
located from the power center. This is particularly true in cases in which insurgents are supported 
by local population. This finding is also in line with the theoretical claim, which argues that the 
ruling elite in the Arab world disregard remote events less critical to their political survival. The 
recent internal conflicts in both Libya and Syria attest to this fact. The positive relationship 
between access to international border and duration of civil conflict found in this research is also 
in line with the safe havens theory (Arreguin-Toft, 2005 
77
) and the supportive ethnic kin theory 
(Salehyan, 2007 
78). The week rebels’ link to civil war duration in the Arab world is also in line 
with previous research (e.g. Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009 
79
). The rough terrain hypothesis is 
partially supported as we find that forest, but not mountain, coverage to be positively related to 
the duration of civil conflict. In fact this variable has yielded previously mixed results. For 
example, Collier, Elliot, Hegre and Hoeffler (2003) 
80
 reported no relationship between 
mountainous terrain and forest cover on one hand and the duration of 55 civil wars. However, 
DeRouen and Sobek (2004) 
81
 showed that forest cover increases the risk of prolonged civil 
conflicts. These conflicting results might be attributed to the different terrain measures used 
across the different empirical studies. Finally, although we find that oil prolongs civil conflicts in 
the Arab world, this relationship was not statistically significant. Probably this result might be 
explained by the fact that oil is not easily exploited resource by the insurgents because oil fields 
in the Arab world are under the governments’ tight security (The National, 2011 82). 
 
In this research we focused on some salient geopolitical variables in an attempt to understand 
factors playing a role in civil war duration in the Arab world. Future research may investigate the 
influence of other variables such as external intervention, the regime type, the level of 
development and the distribution of ethnic and religious composition on internal conflicts’ 
duration in the Arab world. In fact there is a growing literature investigating the effect of 
external intervention on the duration of internal conflicts (e.g. Regan, 2002 
83
). Such studies have 
found that third-part interventions are likely to prolong civil wars (e.g. Balch-Lindsay & 
Enterline, 2000 
84). Future research may test whether this result holds in the Arab World’s civil 
wars. There is also a growing body of literature investigating whether religion plays a central or 
peripheral role in civil wars (e.g. Svensson, 2007 
85
; Lai, 2006 
86
). Future research may explore 
the relationship between religious beliefs and the duration of civil wars in the Arab world. 
Several other studies have used regime type and the level of economic development as standard 
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variables related to civil wars (e.g. Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch, 2001 
87
). Yet another 
stream of research has investigated the impact of foreign aid on the duration of civil wars (e.g. 
Renner, 2002 
88
). This line of research has found a statistically significant negative effect of 
foreign aid flows on the probability of ongoing civil conflicts to continue. Future research may 
investigate whether this result holds in the Arab World’s civil conflicts. Future research may also 
study the influence of such variables in the duration of internal conflicts in the Arab world. 
Population fractionalization across different ethnic and religious groups might also be an avenue 
for future research. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. SOM-Ward and the U-matrix clusters 
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Figure 2. SOM Feature maps                                    
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Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier Survival Functions 
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Table 1. Clusters summaries 
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Table 2. Product moment correlations matrix 
 Dur Dist BordDist ConfBord Mt Frst Oil FightCap 
Dur 1        
Dist 0.138* 1       
BordDist -0.059 0.788** 1      
ConfBord 0.560** 0.125 -0.134* 1     
Mt -0.038 -0.502** -0.713** 0.105 1    
Frst 0.008 0.492** 0.469** 0.047 -0.360** 1   
Oil 0.268** -0.165* 0.110 0.073 -0.386** 0.031 1  
FightCap -0.227** -0.090 -0.186** -0.132 0.257** 0.179** -0.417** 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level *(2-tailed) 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level *(2-tailed) 
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Table 3. Event history analysis of Arab world’s civil conflicts’ duration (1948-2003) 
 
Variable      Model 1       Model 2      Model 3      Model 4 
Distance (ln) 
Border conflict 
Distance x Border 
Rebels’ Fighting  Capability 
Petroleum availability 
Mountains coverage (%) 
Forests coverage (%) 
Post-Cold War (1989)                 
Constant 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
Number of observations 
Number of failures 
Wald Chi-square 
     0.173 
     2.349 
    -0.224 
 
 
 
 
    -0.044 
      5.513* 
-105.393 
         227 
           25 
        4.51 
       1.601*** 
       0.697 
      -1.632*** 
      -0.765 
 
 
 
      -0.149 
      -1.858*** 
    -78.553 
          206 
             21 
   1225.43 
       1.058*** 
       2.713*** 
      -1.096*** 
      -1.172 
       1.062 
 
 
      -0.577 
      -1.532*** 
    -74.304 
           206 
              21 
    1199.42 
       1.531*** 
       0.291 
      -1.931*** 
      -0.876*** 
       0.795 
      -0.197 
       0.194*** 
      -0.274 
      -0.918 
    -75.216 
           206 
             21 
   1743.47 
Prob. > Chi-square       0.341        0.000         0.000        0.000 
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p <.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
